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PROPOSED

16 December 1947

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7

#### DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION

Under the authority of paragraph 7 of National Security Countil Intelligence Directive 1:

- The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the exploitation within the United States of business concerns, other organizations, and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.
- To implement this undertaking, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:
  - Determine the foreign intelligence potential of sources so that the best available may be selected expeditiously for exploitation upon the receipt of collection requests from the intelligence agencies.
  - b. Establish uniform procedures and standards for the security clearance of contacts in this field for the guidance and control of all pertinent agencies, including a provision for Central Intelligence Agency clearance of all proposed agency contacts.
  - Establish in compliance with the third proviso of Section 102 (d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 uniform procedures to insure that the interests of individuals and organizations contacted will not be jeopardized.
  - d. Collect through the establishment of interagency field offices within the United States, foreign intelligence information

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required in the interests of the national security or by the individual intelligence agencies.

- e. Arrange for direct contact between intelligence agency representatives and domestic non-governmental sources whenever conditions require such action or upon the request of a member agency to secure technical or other foreign intelligence information.
- <u>f</u>. Obtain and maintain the overall cooperation of individuals and of responsible policy-making officials of organizations having a foreign intelligence potential.
- g. Inform the intelligence agencies of the prospective departure from or return to the United States of selected American citizens having a high foreign intelligence potential, so that the agencies may furnish requirements or provide specialists for briefing or interrogation.
- h. Disseminate to the appropriate agencies all foreign intelligence information obtained through this program. Reports produced by the agencies shall be identified as such.
- 3. Further to implement this undertaking, the intelligence agencies shall:
  - a. Assign to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency field offices, within agency capabilities, representatives to serve the interests of their respective agencies, under the direction of the CIA managers.
  - b. Send directly to the Central Intelligence Agency for collection all their requests for foreign intelligence information from domestic non-governmental sources.

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appropriate dissemination full information and reports resulting from approved direct contacts by agency representatives with domestic non-governmental sources, identifying such sources by CIA code number.

- d. Transmit to the Central Intelligence Agency for editing, for source security, and for appropriate dissemination all foreign intelligence information which has been received by the Department of State, the components of the National Military Establishment, and the Atomic Energy Commission as a by-product of their normal relationship with American business concerns and other organizations in connection with non-intelligence activities.
- e. Make available to the Central Intelligence Agency all information now possessed or subsequently acquired by the Department of State, the components of the National Military Establishment, and the Atomic Energy Commission concerning American individuals and organizations having foreign intelligence potential.
- 4. Each agency participating in this program will nominate a representative to serve on a committee, under the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, to meet periodically to consider mutual problems and interests in connection with this program.
- 5. Nothing in this program shall be interpreted to affect the established relationship of the departments and agencies with business concerns, other organizations, and individuals in the United States for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intelligenceved Fer Releases 2002 10 110 CIARDP 6 2005 9 A000 100 100 101 4